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ABSTRACT
We live in an era of online disinformation. In the blink of an eye, any person
can share a lie online with hundreds of people; within hours, that lie may
have been seen by thousands or millions. Though the threat of online “echo
chambers” has been exaggerated, the danger of online disinformation to
informed voting has not. Each Canadian voter has a Charter right to be
reasonably informed about candidates running for election, but online
disinformation is threatening that right. The government of Canada may
have a positive duty to protect this right; at the very least, it is a matter of
good governance to counteract online disinformation. This obligation,
however, is complicated by Canada’s ratification of CUSMA. Under article
19.17(2) of CUSMA, Canada has agreed to not pass laws that hold thirtyparty platforms liable for content, including disinformation, posted on their
websites. Article 19.17(2), however, must be interpreted narrowly in order
to protection section 3 rights: though Canada cannot pass laws that hold
thirty-platforms liable for user-generated content, it may create laws that
hold such platforms liable for failure to remove user-generated
disinformation. There are several tools the Canadian government may
utilize to enforce such laws and combat disinformation generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Swift’s observation that “falsehood flies, and the truth comes
limping after” 1 is just as relevant today as it was in 1710. In the internet age,
information can be shared across the world incredibly quickly; unfortunately, this
information is often false, which can have negative effects on the democratic
process. Under section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 every Canadian has
the right to be reasonably informed about the platforms of political candidates
and parties before voting.3 But two online phenomena may be threatening this
right: “echo chambers” and disinformation. Within an online “echo chamber,” a
group of people repeat and reinforce their shared ideology to one another.
Research suggests, however, that the threat of echo chambers has been greatly
exaggerated. Not so for the second phenomenon, online disinformation, which
presents a real danger to informed voting. The threat posed by online
disinformation may potentially be heightened by Canada’s international trade
commitments unless Parliament takes appropriate action to combat it. In the
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (“CUSMA”), Canada has promised to not
hold third-party platforms liable for user-generated content.4 But this promise
must be interpreted in accordance with the Government of Canada’s possible
Charter duty to protect informed voting from the dangers of online
disinformation. Interpreting CUSMA through a Charter lens should disallow
Canada from holding third-party platforms civilly liable for user-generated
content but allow Parliament to impose liability on such platforms for failing to
take reasonable action to detect and remove disinformation.
This paper will explore Canada’s obligations under section 3 of the Charter
in relation to the threats of online echo chambers and disinformation. Given the
threat that disinformation, in particular, may pose to an individual’s right to cast
Jonathan Swift, “Political Lying,” The Examiner No. XIV (November 9, 1710), online:
<www.bartleby.com/209633.html>.
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 3, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
3 Figueroa v Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 37 at paras 35, 54 [Figueroa].
4 The Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, 30 November 2018, art 19.17(2) (entered
into force 13 March 2020) [CUSMA].
1
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an informed vote and Canada’s obligations under CUSMA, it will be argued that
the Government of Canada may have a positive duty to protect informed voting.
Whether or not such a duty exists, the Government still should, as a matter of
good governance, take action to protect informed voting. To that end, this paper
will explore the various tools Canada’s Parliament could use to protect informed
voting from online disinformation, including the different architectural models
the government could, via legislation and regulation, impose upon the online
sphere. These tools, however, will be most successful if they combine the
resources of the government and the ingenuity of private industry.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMED VOTING
Section 3 is a broad Charter right. It guarantees the right of each Canadian
citizen “to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a
legislative assembly,” and the right to be a candidate for such positions.5
However, section 3 includes additional rights beyond what this straightforward
text might suggest. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has read the section
purposively, expanding its meaning to include more than simply the right to vote
and to be a candidate. In Figueroa v Canada (AG), the SCC was asked to determine
whether federal legislation that restricted political parties from accessing certain
benefits unless they nominated candidates in fifty electoral districts violated
section 3.6 The SCC determined that section 3, as a Charter right, demands a
“broad and purposive approach” and held that section 3 includes “the right of
each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.”7
The right to meaningful participation has also been interpreted as including
an informational component. In Figueroa, the SCC held that each voter has the
right to be “reasonably informed” about each candidate, because voters cannot
properly vote if they are not informed about the candidates’ platforms.8 In Harper
v Canada (AG), while determining whether spending limits on electoral advertising
Charter, supra note 2, s 3.
Figueroa, supra note 3.
7 Ibid, at paras 20, 25.
8 Ibid, at paras 35, 54.
5
6
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violated section 3, the SCC built on this holding. The Court held that “to be wellinformed, the citizen must be able to weigh the relative strengths and weakness
of each candidate and political party” and to understand the differences between
such parties “where they exist.”9

ONLINE DISRUPTIONS OF INFORMED VOTING10
Disruption #1—The Echo Chamber

There are, however, two online phenomena that may be threatening
Canadians’ ability to cast informed votes. The first of these phenomena is the
online “echo chamber.” The echo chamber emerges from the social theory of
“homophily,” which observes that people form relationships with those who
share their “interests and values.”11 The “echo chamber” is a social setting that
results from such homophilic relationships. In the chamber, the only “ideas,
information and beliefs” shared are those that accord with the ideology of the
group. Therefore, people “only encounter things they already agree with,” never
searching for alternative perspectives.12
Echo chambers are antithetical to political knowledge and engagement.
Whereas those who seek out different opinions are “more informed and [engage]
society in healthy deliberation,” those engrossed in “inwardly focused groups”
lose the ability to “challenge their own views,” settling instead for their existing

Harper v Canada (AG), 2004 SCC 33 at para 71 [Harper].
Note that the sources in this paper regarding the existence of echo chambers and
online disinformation are primarily American. There is a paucity of studies on these
subjects in the Canadian context. For that reason, I have proceeded on the assumption
that Canadians’ consumption of online news is similar to Americans’. While Canadians
do use online platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, they are also able to
access news sources that are not accessible in the United States.
11 Catherine Grevet, Loren Terveen & Eric Gilbert, “Managing Political Differences in
Social Media” in CSCW 2014—Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer
Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (Baltimore: Association for Computing
Machinery, 2014) 1400 at 1400.
12 Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank, “The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating
effect of political interest and diverse media” (2018) 21:5 Information Communication
& Society 729 at 729.
9

10
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beliefs.13 Indeed, studies have shown that echo chambers, where they do exist,
cause people to misperceive important facts regarding current events.14
Therefore, those not caught in echo chambers are more likely to cast an informed
vote, while those inside echo chambers are less likely to do so.
Nevertheless, there is debate as to whether online echo chambers have
become a widespread phenomenon with the potential to disrupt informed voting.
Social media platforms have the potential “to expose individuals to more diverse
viewpoints,” but also “to limit exposure to attitude-challenging information.”15
While this potential is so apparent as to be indisputable, studies have disagreed as
to which potential these online platforms have realized.
Studies Supporting the Existence of Online Echo Chambers

Numerous studies have concluded that echo chambers are present online.
For example, Barberá et al analyzed the content of Twitter conversations relating
to twelve “[political and non-political] events and issues” that occurred during
2011 and 2012.16 The study used a method that “[generated] valid estimates of
the ideological positions” of specific social media users to determine whether
individuals were “retweeting” those who shared or did not share their ideology.17
Barberá et al found that though individuals may receive information from
ideologically-diverse sources, they are much more likely to retweet information
conforming with their own ideology, suggesting that echo chambers are present
online.18
Williams et al also found evidence supporting the existence of online echo
chambers. They collected data on five Twitter hashtags related to climate change
and analyzed “the distribution of attitudes amongst users utilizing each study
Grevet, Terveen & Gilbert, supra note 11 at 1400.
Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing & Lada A Adamic, “Exposure to ideologically
diverse news and opinion on Facebook” (2015) 348:6239 Science 1130 at 1130.
15 Ibid.
16 Barberá et al, “Tweeting from Left to Right: Is Online Political Communication More
Than an Echo Chamber?” (2015) 26:10 Psychological Science 1531 at 1533.
17 Ibid at 1532.
18 Ibid at 1540.
13
14
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hashtag.”19 They found that individuals discussing climate change were
“embedded within communities of like-minded users.”20 Similarly, Grevet,
Terveen, and Gilbert found that although people may converse and have
friendships with people of diverse ideologies, these relationships tend to dissolve
in the face of political disagreement.21 Furthermore, in yet another study,
researchers observed echo chambers forming in “clusters” around “popular
individuals, celebrities, [and] organizations.”22 More specifically, they found that
Twitter communities coalesced around Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton before
the 2016 election, and that “certain opinion leaders were responsible for creating
homogenous communities on Twitter.”23
Studies Disputing the Existence of Online Echo Chambers

There are also, however, numerous studies contending that the presence of
online echo chambers has been overstated. Shore, Baek, and Dellarocas found
that typical Twitter users retweet articles that, on average, are more centrist than
the articles they normally read online.24 Likewise, a study of 50,000 online news
consumers found that “when presented with a mixture of one- and two-sided
news stories, the typical user did not choose information that only complied with
their beliefs at the expense of the other article.”25 It also found that Facebook
does not “screen out” articles that may conflict with a user’s ideology; to the
contrary, “more than one in five political stories” users saw on their newsfeed did
not conform with their beliefs.26
Williams et al, “Network analysis reveals open forums and echo chambers in social
media discussions of climate change” (2016) 32 Elsevier Science 126 at 126, 129.
20 Ibid at 135.
21 Grevet, Terveen & Gilbert, supra note 11 at 1406.
22 Lei Guo, Jacob A Rhode & H Denis Wu, “Who is responsible for Twitter’s echo
chamber problem? Evidence from 2016 election networks” (2020) 23:2 Information
Communication & Society 234 at 236.
23 Ibid at 246.
24 Jesse Shore, Jiye Baek & Chrysanthos Dellarocas, “Twitter is Not the Echo Chamber
We Think It Is” (2018) 60:1 MIT Sloan Management Rev 1 at 2.
25 R Kelly Garrett, “The ‘Echo Chamber’ Distraction: Disinformation Campaigns are
the Problem, Not Audience Fragmentation” (2017) 6:4 J Applied Research Memory &
Cognition 370 at 371.
26 Ibid.
19
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Dubois and Blank suggest that certain studies find evidence of online echo
chambers by using an artificially narrow scope that focuses on single online
platforms.27 According to Dubois and Blank, internet media is often polarized on
a piecemeal basis, resulting in “partisan news websites, blogs, and some social
media.”28 These single-platform studies fail, however, to recognize that internet
users rarely seek political news from a single platform. Instead, they visit multiple
media sources to obtain different reports and perspectives.29 Indeed, users
consume a media diet consisting not only of online news sources, but also of
offline sources such as television, newspapers, and even “face-to-face
conversations with friends.”30 Therefore, although discussions on Twitter and
other social media platforms may be polarized, when Dubois and Blank analyzed
“the entire media environment,” they found “little apparent echo chamber.”31
While a fulsome exploration of Canadian voters’ media consumption is
beyond the scope of this article, and most of the available studies are focused on
the effects of echo chambers in the United States, the evidence suggests that
online echo chambers may not be a serious threat to Canadians’ ability to cast
informed votes. As Dubois and Blank observe, although localized echo chambers
may exist on specific websites or in specific online communities, most people
venture outside such chambers in search of different perspectives and reports.32
It ought to be noted, however, that patterns in media consumption could change,
which is underscored by the ongoing consolidation and concentration of media
sources in Canada.33 Whether and to what extent Canadian voters are exposed
to sources of information outside of online echo chambers remains to be seen.

Dubois & Blank, supra note 12 at 740.
Ibid at 732.
29 Ibid at 732-33.
30 Ibid at 732.
31 Ibid at 740.
32 Ibid at 732.
33 See Dwayne Winseck, “Media and Internet Concentration in Canada, 1984-2019” (16
December 2020), online (pdf): Canadian Media Concentration Research Project
<www.cmcrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Media-and-Internet-Concentrationin-Canada-1984%E2%80%932019-07012021.pdf>.
27
28
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Disruption #2—Disinformation

The online spread of disinformation poses a more significant threat to
informed voting. Different interested parties, including “political strategists,
private interests, and foreign powers,” may spread disinformation “for political
gain.”34 Of course, as Garrett observes (and as Jonathan Swift made clear in the
eighteenth century) political manipulation through lies is nothing new.35 But the
advent of the internet has dramatically recontextualized this political strategy.
Although the internet has increased our ability to share and access factual
information, it has also made spreading falsehoods easier than ever, with little to
no investment of finances or effort required.36 And as the main meeting places of
the internet, social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook are prime
platforms for spreading disinformation. The danger of online disinformation may
be difficult to overstate: it has the potential to allow for foreign interference in
elections and has even undermined COVID-19 vaccination efforts.37
Before discussing the possible effects of disinformation, it may be useful to
set out some definitions. “Disinformation”—commonly referred to as “fake
news”—is “content that is intentionally false and designed to cause harm.”38
People create and spread disinformation for many reasons, including for
pecuniary and ideological purposes. Those motivated by profit understand that
viral news items on social media platforms can entice users to follow the attached
link, bringing them to the website hosting the article and increasing the site’s
advertisement revenue.39 Others may use that same ability to advance the interests
Garrett, supra note 25 at 372.
Ibid.
36 Michael Karanicolas, “Subverting Democracy to Save Democracy: Canada’s ExtraConstitutional Approaches to Battling ‘Fake News’” (2019) 17:2 CJLT 200 at 201.
37 See Zapan Barua et al, “Effects of Misinformation on COVID-19 Individual
Responses and Recommendations for Resilience of Disastrous Consequences of
Misinformation” (2020) 8:100119 Progress in Disaster Science.
38 Claire Wardle, “Misinformation Has Created a New World Disorder” (1 September
2019), online: Scientific American <www.scientificamerican.com/article/misinformationhas-created-a-new-world-disorder/>.
39 Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election” (2017) 31:2 J Economic Perspectives 211 at 217.
34
35
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of particular political ideologies or candidates.40 Wardle, however, contends that
most disinformation is not designed to change political opinions per se, but rather
“to cause confusion, to overwhelm and to undermine trust in democratic
institutions from the electoral system to journalism.”41 In either case, the spread
of disinformation has the potential to damage Canadians’ ability to cast an
informed vote.
Disinformation is most dangerous when it becomes misinformation.
“Misinformation” is disinformation that is “shared by a person who does not
realise it is false or misleading.”42 Therefore, as disinformation is “shared” on
Facebook or “retweeted” on Twitter, it becomes misinformation. Although the
average Facebook or Twitter user may not believe a stranger’s post or tweet, the
ultimate goal of those who create disinformation is that at least some users will
share disinformation with their “friends” or “followers.” In doing so, these
individuals “use their own social capital to reinforce and give credibility to the
original message,” thus increasing the chance their online community will believe
it.43 The post is then shared again, and the cycle continues, broadening in scope
and influencing more and more people.
Social media platforms are ideal locations for sharing disinformation.
Creating websites that host misleading or false news articles is easier than ever.44
But the creators of disinformation need to post links to their sites on popular
social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, to generate traffic and
exposure for their disinformation.45 Sixty-two percent of Americans obtain a
portion of their news from social media platforms.46 Given the cultural
similarities between Americans and Canadians in terms of access to social media
platforms, that number is likely similar in Canada. Furthermore, as discussed

Ibid.
Wardle, supra note 38.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Allcott & Gentzkow supra note 39 at 214.
45 Ibid at 214-15.
46 Ibid at 223.
40
41
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below, these platforms have not yet provided reliable tools to more easily enable
users to identify disinformation.
The Effects of Disinformation

The data produced by different studies suggest that individuals are regularly
exposed to disinformation on social media platforms. Allcott and Gentzkow
examined all articles containing disinformation about Donald Trump and Hilary
Clinton on Snopes and Politifact, two fact-checking websites, along with a
compiled list of “fake news” articles from Buzzfeed.com.47 They then determined
how many times each piece of disinformation “was shared on Facebook as of
early December 2016”—that is, before and after the election.48 The results were
startling. They determined that, in total, social media users shared the
disinforming articles 38 million times, translating into approximately “760 million
visits, or about three visits per US adult.”49 They also found that the most popular
“fake news” stories on Facebook were shared more than the most popular
mainstream stories, and that many people who read “fake news” stories believe
them.50
The effects of online disinformation exposure are both collective and
individual. Allcott and Gentzkow found that the most discussed “fake news”
stories surrounding the 2016 American election favoured Donald Trump, leading
to the suggestion that Trump may not have won the election without “the
influence of fake news.”51 While Allcott and Gentzkow’s conclusions are
qualified, their findings nevertheless suggest that where the majority of
disinformation favours a certain candidate, disinformation campaigns could
influence and potentially decide a close election.
Although echo chambers may not threaten the Charter rights of Canadians,
online disinformation has more potential to do so. The online dissemination of
disinformation threatens the right of every Canadian to cast an informed vote.
Ibid at 219.
Ibid at 219.
49 Ibid at 225.
50 Ibid at 212.
51 Ibid.
47
48
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Factual news is still available, but the danger of disinformation is that voters do
not know what is true and what is false. As Chen, Conroy, and Rubin state, “with
so many sources of varying quality, it becomes difficult for readers to evaluate the
credibility and trustworthiness of what they see on the internet.”52 Disinformation
can render readers of online news suspicious of all online information, whether
it be factual or false. Thus, voters are handicapped in their efforts to determine
“the true state of the world” and “which electoral candidate they prefer.”53 For
this reason, the remainder of this paper will analyze possible government action
against disinformation.

GOVERNMENT ACTION
Canada’s Possible Duty to Protect the Informed Vote

Although online dissemination of disinformation may be disrupting
Canadians’ ability to cast informed votes, it is unclear whether the Government
of Canada has a Charter duty to do anything about it. The caselaw surrounding
section 3 is indeterminate on this issue. In Harper, the SCC decided that
government action protecting the right to “vote in an informed manner” was
constitutional.54 And in Figueroa, the SCC stated that section 3 imposes a negative
duty on Parliament to not interfere with this right.55 But no court has decided
whether section 3 imposes a positive duty on Parliament to protect Canadians’
section 3 rights when they are threatened, as they may be by online
disinformation.
The caselaw regarding positive Parliamentary duties under section 2 of the
Charter, however, suggests that such a positive duty may exist.56 In Dunmore v
Ontario (AG), Ontario had excluded agricultural workers from its statutory labour
Yimin Chen, Niall J Conroy & Victoria L Rubin, “News in an Online World: The
Need for an ‘Automatic Crap Detector’” (2016) 52:1 Proceedings Assoc Information
Science & Technology 1 at 1.
53 Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 39 at 212.
54 Harper, supra note 9 at para 68-71.
55 Figueroa, supra note 3 at para 51.
56 Charter, supra note 2 (enumerating the fundamental freedoms Canadians enjoy under
the Charter, s 2).
52
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relations regime. In response, a group of agricultural workers brought an action
arguing that the exclusion infringed their section 2(d) right to freedom of
association.57 The issue of the case was whether section 2(d) contained a positive
component requiring Parliament and provincial legislatures to include certain
groups in their statutory labour regimes. The SCC held that such a positive duty
may exist in specific situations and established the process for determining when
this duty exists.58 This process, or “test,” was succinctly summarized by the SCC
in Baier v Alberta:
First, [a court] must consider whether the activity for which the
claimant seeks s. 2(b) protection is a form of expression. If so, then
second, the court must determine if the claimant claims a positive
entitlement to government action, or simply the right to be free from
government interference. If it is a positive rights claim, then third, the
three Dunmore factors must be considered […] These three factors are
(1) that the claim is grounded in a fundamental freedom of expression
rather than in access to a particular statutory regime; (2) that the
claimant has demonstrated that exclusion from a statutory regime has
the effect of a substantial interference with s.2(b) freedom of
expression, or has the fundamental freedom. If the claimant cannot
satisfy these criteria then the s.2(b) claim will fail. If the three factors
are satisfied then s.2(b) has been infringed and the analysis will shift to
s.1.59

In lieu of a positive duty test for section 3, I will adapt this section 2(d) test
to the language of section 3 and use it to determine whether section 3 may impose
a positive duty on the government to intervene against the spread of
disinformation.
Although there is no way to definitively determine whether a court would
find that this duty exists, a hypothetical application of this hybrid test suggests
that it may. We have already determined the answers to the first two parts of the
test: informed voting is a component of the right to vote, and our hypothetical
claimant will be seeking positive government action to protect this right. In the
third step of the test, to establish a positive duty, the claimant may satisfy the
court that all three of the (altered) Dunmore factors were fulfilled. First, the
Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94.
Ibid at paras 39, 41-43.
59 Baier v Alberta, 2007 SCC 31 at para 30.
57
58
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claimant would have to prove the claim was not grounded in access to a statutory
regime but in a fundamental freedom included in section 3. Here, the claim is
grounded in the right to vote in an informed manner, which is guaranteed by
section 3, not by statute. Second, the claimant would have to demonstrate that
exclusion from a statutory regime had interfered with her right to cast an
informed vote. In this scenario, this step would likely not be relevant as it is not
exclusion from a particular regime that leaves the right to informed voting
unprotected, but government inaction generally.
Third, the claimant would have to demonstrate that government inaction
has caused a substantial interference with her right to cast an informed vote. This
third factor would be the most difficult to satisfy. As discussed above, in the
absence of government action, disinformation has pervaded social media and has
misled voters about the ideologies and platforms of political candidates. But it is
private parties, not the Canadian government, who are spreading disinformation
and damaging informed voting. Nevertheless, there are two arguments the
claimant could make at this step. First, the claimant could argue that section 3,
unlike section 2, inherently requires positive action from the State: the
government would certainly infringe section 3 if it did not take the positive action
of holding an election, for example. Second, the claimant could argue that the
government has a duty to regulate social media platforms because, although they
are owned by private companies like Facebook and Twitter, these platforms are
the new marketplace of ideas, where much of our political discussion occurs.
Thus, the claimant could argue that the government has a duty to intervene and
ensure that trustworthy information, not disinformation, guides political
discussions.
There is no definitive way to determine whether a court would find that this
positive duty exists. Nevertheless, even if it does not, it may be a matter of good
governance to counteract online disinformation for the reasons discussed above.

76
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SECTION 230 AND CUSMA
Before discussing how the government could counter disinformation, we
must first discuss Section 230 of the American Communications Decency Act. Section
230 insulates online third-party platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, from
liability for the content their users may post or share on their platforms.60
Through ratifying CUSMA, Canada has agreed to implement a version of Section
230 in Canada and not pass laws that hold third-party platforms liable for the
content, including disinformation, posted on their websites. More specifically,
article 19.17(2) requires that all signatories, including Canada, not
adopt or maintain measures that treat a supplier or user of an
interactive computer service as an information content provider in
determining liability for harms related to information stored,
processed, transmitted, distributed, or made available by the service,
except to the extent the supplier or user has, in whole or in part,
created, or developed the information.61

Canada, then, must meet two goals. The government must fulfill its CUSMA
obligation by passing laws and regulations that disallow courts from holding
third-party platforms liable for user-generated content, including disinformation,
but the government must do so in such a way as to respect the protection of
informed voting. In other words, Canada’s promise under CUSMA must be
interpreted in a fashion that allows the government to protect informed voting.
Analyzing the American version of section 230 gives some indication of
what a Canadian version may look like. The premise of America’s Section 230 is
that “the mistakes caused by liability are worse than the mistakes caused by
immunity.”62 If platforms could be held liable for user-generated content, they
would likely protect themselves from such liability by removing too much

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
CUSMA, supra note 4, art 19.17(2).
62 James Grimmelman, “To Err Is Platform” (6 April 2018), online: Knight First
Amendment Institute <knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform>.
60
61
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content.63 Thus, the logic goes, it is better to allow too much to remain online
than to limit users’ free expression by removing too much.
In the United States, Section 230 effectively removes liability from platforms
that allow disinformation to be posted and remain on their websites. Online
disinformation blends into other user-generated content on social media
platforms, and as discussed above, users then “engage with and amplify” this
disinformation. Third-party platforms have the most control over user-generated
content and thus the most ability to combat disinformation; yet, they “remain
inoculated from liability for its effects,” and thus have little incentive to do so.64
In this way, “Section 230 effectively underwrites” user-generated content meant
to mislead and disinform the public.65
In her discussion of the regulation of third-party platforms, Klonick holds
that, because these platforms effectively protect free speech in America, they do
not require further regulation.66 She contends that companies such as YouTube,
Facebook, and Twitter are “economically and normatively motivated” to regulate
themselves as necessary, and therefore do not require government interference.67
Klonick, writing from an American legal perspective, believes that these
platforms will “reflect the democratic culture and free speech expectations of
their users” by protecting their ability to exercise free speech.68
But protection of free speech is not enough in Canada. Whereas the United
States has a rich history of free speech protection, Canada has already shown its
unwillingness to sacrifice informed voting for the sake of unfettered political
speech. In Harper, the SCC determined that spending limits on third-party
Ibid.
John Bowers & Jonathan Zittrain, “Answering Impossible Questions: Content
Governance in an Age of Disinformation” (2020) 1:1 Harvard Kennedy School
Misinformation Rev 1 at 4.
65 Olivier Sylvain, “Discriminatory Designs on User Data” (1 April 2018), online: Knight
First Amendment Institute <knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-userdata>.
66 Kate Klonick, “The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech” (2017) 131:1598 Harv L Rev 1599 at 1603.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
63
64
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electoral advertising were a justified limit on free speech (in part) because they
prevented wealthy parties from dominating political discourse, thus allowing
voters to be informed about all political parties instead of just those with the most
money.69 If Canada, allows third-party platforms to focus only on protecting free
speech, it will also enable the continued dissemination of political disinformation.
It is not enough that American companies self-regulate to protect free speech;
Canada must also ensure that they regulate to protect informed voting.
Therefore, the Canadian version of Section 230 must be written and
interpreted more narrowly than the American version in order to actualize the
full meaning of section 3. Article 19.17(2) of CUSMA holds that no signatory will
create or maintain laws that hold third-party platforms liable for information
shared on their platforms by internet users.70 The narrow interpretation of this
Article, which still allows the Canadian government to protect informed voting,
is one that does not hold third-party platforms liable for the civil damages
associated with user-generated content; it may, however, hold them liable for
failure to take reasonable efforts to remove such content.
This interpretation accords with Prime Minister Trudeau’s intentions. As
Hedger observes, the Prime Minister has signalled that he will begin to regulate
online third-party platforms in ways not required by the American Section 230.71
In Trudeau’s “Mandate Letter” to his Minister of Canadian Heritage, Steven
Guilbeault, the Prime Minister states that his government will be crafting “new
regulations for social media platforms,” including a requirement that they
“remove illegal content, including hate speech, within 24 hours.”72 The letter
makes no mention of action against disinformation but does suggest a willingness
to regulate platforms like Facebook and Twitter, where disinformation is often
disseminated.
Harper, supra note 9 at paras 91, 105-7.
CUSMA, supra note 4, art 19.17(2).
71 Patrick Hedger, “USMCA Won’t Protect Tech from Trudeau” (last modified 16
March 2020), online: Competitive Enterprise Institute <cei.org/blog/usmca-wont-protecttech-trudeau>.
72 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Canadian Heritage Mandate Letter” (13
December 2019), online: Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada <pm.gc.ca/en/mandateletters/2019/12/13/minister-canadian-heritage-mandate-letter>.
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Prime Minister Trudeau’s desire to regulate online third-party platforms
without imposing direct liability for user-generated content upon them is
emblematic of a larger shift in Canadians’ attitude towards such platforms.
Section 230 emerged from the “Rights Era,” during which society was concerned
with protecting the burgeoning capitalistic potential of internet development
from burdensome government regulation.73 However, as third-party platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter became powerful corporations, public opinion
shifted into the “Public Health Era,” during which people became concerned
with the harms third-party platforms were causing by, among other things,
enabling the spread of disinformation.74 Trudeau’s actions place him in the
current era: the “Process Era.” In this current era, Canadian society is developing
tools that both maintain the rights of third-party platforms and protect Canadians
from the harmful effects of such platforms, including the spread of
disinformation.75
Tools for Combatting Disinformation Online and Protecting the Right to Vote

The protection of informed voting will require a joint effort between
corporations and the government. Process-era solutions, because they respect
public rights and private interests, may best use solutions that “assign platforms
new duties” while also “delegate[ing] important aspects of the content
governance process outside of the platforms themselves,” presumably to public
agencies.76 More specifically, the most successful methods for combatting
disinformation are those that use the guidance of the public sector and the
resources and abilities of third-party platforms.
I have organized these methods according to the “collection of tools”
society possesses “for affecting constraints upon behaviour.”77 Lessig separates
these tools into four categories: law, marketplace, social norms, and architecture.78
Bowers & Zittrain, supra note 64 at 2.
Ibid.
75 Ibid at 3.
76 Ibid at 5.
77 Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach” (1999) 113:2
Harv L Rev 501 at 502.
78 Ibid at 507.
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Although I have separated these recommendations into different categories, they
may interrelate. Many may be more effective if used together, and a solution may
fall primarily into one category but feature aspects of another. For example, nearly
all of the solutions below have a legal dimension in that they would require some
form of legislative action from the government.
Tool #1—Law

Law regulates behaviour by “order[ing] people to behave in certain ways”
and “threatening punishment if they do not obey.”79 Law-making is perhaps the
most direct form of behavioural control: the State tells us what we cannot do.
Section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act is an excellent example of the most
direct use of law to combat disinformation. The section penalizes those who,
“with the intention of affecting the results of an election,” make false statements
about a candidate during the election period.80 The benefit of this law, and others
like it, is its simplicity: it punishes those who fulfill its actus reus and mens rea
elements. But its simplicity has downsides. First, it does not assign any
responsibility to third-party platforms to detect or report such disinformation,
and thus uses none of their resources. Additionally, it attacks the dissemination
of disinformation on a case-by-case basis rather than stemming it at its source.
Furthermore, the section only applies during the election period, and so anyone
outside this period can publish and spread disinformation about a political
candidate without consequence. And the section cannot address disinformation
coming from outside the country if Canada does not have an extradition
agreement with the offender’s country of residence. These limitations are evident
in the law’s record: so far, no one has been charged with an offence under section
91(1).81
A more effective use of legal tools may be a law that holds platforms liable
for failing to detect and remove disinformation. This method would not hold
platforms civilly liable for user-generated disinformation itself, but liable to the
Ibid.
Canada Elections Act, SC 2000, c 9, s 91(1).
81 Karanicolas, supra note 36 at 204.
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government for failing to take action to remove user-generated disinformation in
a timely manner. In other words, third-party platforms would not be liable for
another’s actions, but for their own inaction. Germany uses a form of this
method: the government fines “social media companies if they fail to remove
‘obviously illegal’ content within 24 hours upon receiving a complaint.”82 To
borrow language from CUSMA Article 19.17, such laws do not treat third-party
platforms as the “information content provider,” but as platforms with
responsibilities related to monitoring the content hosted by such providers.
Bowers and Zittrain’s recommendation of legislating “a fiduciary duty
between platforms and their users” is another legal tool that may prove effective
at fighting disinformation.83 Under this method, because they have vastly more
information and power, third-party platforms would owe their users a fiduciary
duty.84 This approach would not hold platforms civilly liable for disinformation
spread by their users. Instead, it would set specific fiduciary duties—that is, “set
standards for content governance”—requiring platforms to detect and remove
disinformation.85 Platforms would not be liable for the disinformation itself but
for allowing the disinformation to remain on the platform, and would be open to
civil suit from users for breaching this duty.
A fiduciary duty, however, may not be a practical way of combatting
disinformation. Although it may encourage third-party platforms to monitor and
remove disinformation, the threat of an actual lawsuit is minimal: absent a class
action suit, few individuals would be able to sue Facebook or Twitter with hope
of success. Furthermore, the point of disinformation is that most people do not
realize it is disinformation, begging the question of how users would know a thirdparty platform has breached its fiduciary duty.

Haciyakupoglu et al, “Countering Fake News: A Survey of Recent Global Initiatives”
(7 March 2018), online: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies <www.rsis.edu.sg/rsispublication/cens/countering-fake-news-a-survey-of-recent-globalinitiatives/#.Xn4SmYhKjIU> 1 at 3.
83 Bowers & Zittrain, supra note 64 at 6.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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The State can also use “jawboning” to encourage third-party platforms to
remove disinformation. “Jawboning” is a form of “moral suasion,” in which the
State applies “pressure through informal threats of regulation, as opposed to
issuing formal and legally binding orders.”86 To borrow Karanicolas’s example,
the government could “make public statements expressing displeasure” with the
online dissemination of disinformation “and warn that, if nothing is done to
address the problem voluntarily, they will pass costly and restrictive new laws to
bring the company to heel.”87 Jawboning would encourage platforms “to get
ahead of potential government regulation” by instituting their own methods of
combatting disinformation.88 This method may prove a win-win for private and
public interests. First, it removes the government’s political burden to impose the
legal solutions discussed above. Second, it allows third-party platforms, who
understand how to use their technology to detect and remove disinformation
better than anyone, to craft a solution tailored to their platforms.
Tool #2—Marketplace

Markets “regulate by price”89 and (more or less) regulate themselves. To that
end, and as discussed above, Klonick suggests third-party platforms are capable
of regulating themselves as regards the removal of online disinformation in
America.90 That said, the Canadian federal government could intervene with the
market to reduce the dissemination of disinformation. More specifically, it could
pass legislation penalizing advertisers who, upon receiving notice of
disinformation, fail to remove their ads from websites that host disinformation.
Under this system, the government could create an agency to detect and report
disinformation, or the government could rely on citizen reports of possible
disinformation. This method does not hold advertisers liable for disinformation
itself, but would prevent them from profiting from its dissemination.

Karanicolas, supra note 36 at 9.
Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Lessig, supra note 77 at 507.
90 Klonick, supra note 66 at 1603.
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Admittedly, this market-based solution has limitations. It will not combat
Facebook or Twitter posts that share false information without linking to another
website. Furthermore, it may be difficult to force foreign advertisers to remove
advertisements posted within Canadian borders. Lastly, and perhaps most
importantly, this measure would only dissuade financially-motivated, and not
ideologically-motivated, disseminators of disinformation.
Tool #3—Social Norms

The government could also institute policies that create or strengthen certain
social norms that combat online disinformation. Social norms are communal
expressions of values shared by members of the same society. For example, social
norms control “where you smoke” and how you “behave with members of the
opposite sex.”91
Many academics have suggested using education initiatives to instill social
norms regarding the identification of disinformation. Garrett, for example,
suggests that educating individuals on how to spot disinformation could
drastically reduce the number of people who believe and act upon such
disinformation.92 Likewise, Wardle suggests that online users should be “taught
to develop cognitive ‘muscles’ in emotional skepticism and trained to withstand
the onslaught of content designed to trigger base fears and prejudices.”93 Neither
Garrett nor Wardle mention exactly who should do the teaching, but it is safe to
assume that education initiatives would fall under the government’s purview.
Indeed, countries such as Italy, Taiwan, and even Canada are “introducing school
curricula that teach children to discern between false and credible information.”94
Using education to create social norms regarding the detection of
disinformation may prove a valuable tool in fighting disinformation. Still, it
cannot be the only tool. Educating adults on how to detect disinformation would
be difficult, if not impossible. Education initiatives require a dedicated
Ibid.
Garrett, supra note 25 at 372.
93 Wardle, supra note 38.
94 Haciyakupoglu et al, supra note 82 at 7.
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audience—in this case, school-aged children. Even if schools could effectively
educate children on how to spot disinformation before they became adults,
disinformation would still threaten the remainder of voting-age people’s ability to
cast an informed vote.
Tool #4—Architecture

The government could also curb disinformation by regulating the cyber
architecture of third-party platforms. Third-party platforms regulate how users
behave within their corner of cyberspace by constraining what users can do and
how they do it.95 For example, Facebook and Twitter allow their users to “share”
or “retweet” posts with their friends and the people who follow them. As
mentioned, these posts often contain disinformation or links to disinformation.
Many believe that this cyber architecture cannot be regulated because it is fixed
and unchangeable, but that is not true: cyber architecture is code, and code is
eminently changeable.96 The government cannot hold platforms liable for usergenerated disinformation, but it could impose regulations requiring that they use
certain architecture that reduces the presence of disinformation.
The government should work with third-party platforms to develop these
regulations and architectures. Third-party platforms, via the architecture of their
websites, have “near-total control of users’ online experience,” and can
“administer their platform in obscure or undisclosed ways that are meant to
influence how users behave on their site.”97 The State should work with thirdparty platforms to maximize this ability. And for the reasons mentioned in the
“jawboning” discussion above, these platforms have good reason to participate
in such discussions.
Furthermore, whatever strategy the State does employ, it should use
algorithmic programs to detect disinformation. These algorithmic fact-checkers
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are “computer programs that automatically detect disinformation,”98 and may use
both linguistic and network approaches. The linguistic approach analyzes word
“frequency sets,” deep-syntax analysis, and semantic analysis to detect falsehoods
online.99 By contrast, the network approach uses linked data to compare factual
statements against “findable statements about the known world” in order to
determine which factual statements are untrue. This approach can help analyze
social network behaviour to determine the veracity of specific statements.100
The Canadian state could use regulation to impose different architectural
models upon third-party platforms. There are three such architectural models,
which I will now discuss below.
Model #1—The Correction Model
Platforms have been experimenting with a correction model to combat
disinformation. Facebook, for example, has begun “fact checking websites [to]
debunk deceptive information” and “flagging” articles to alert users that they
contain disinformation.101 These developing fact-checking initiatives use both
algorithmic tools and human oversight.102
The correction model, however, has a serious shortcoming. An MIT has
study found that Facebook users “assume that if some articles have
[disinformation] warnings, those that don’t must be accurate.” The study called
this phenomenon the “implied truth effect.”103 Facebook could solve this
problem by increasing the number of people reviewing potential pieces of
Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich KH Ecker & John Cook, “Beyond Misinformation:
Understanding and Coping with the ‘Post-Truth’ Era” (2017) 6:4 J Applied Research
Memory & Cognition 353 at 363.
99 Niall J Conroy, Victoria L Rubin & Yimin Chen, “Automatic Deception Detection:
Methods for Finding Fake News” (2015) 52:1 Proceedings Assoc Information Science
& Technology 1 at 1-2.
100 Ibid at 3.
101 Haciyakupoglu et al, supra note 82 at 11.
102 Ibid at 3-4.
103 David Gilbert, “It’s Official: Facebook’s Fact-Checking Is Making Its Fake News
Problem Even Worse” (5 March 2020), online: Vice
<www.vice.com/en_ca/article/epgqxa/its-official-facebooks-fact-checking-is-makingits-fake-news-problem-even-worse>.
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disinformation or by improving their algorithm—but whether they will do either
remains to be seen.
Even if platforms can detect all pieces of disinformation, it may still not be
enough. Studies have shown that “mere exposure to conspiratorial discourse,
even if the conspiratorial claims are dismissed, makes people less likely to accept
official information.”104 In other words, once they have read disinformation,
after-the-fact corrections are not effective at changing people’s minds.105 Indeed,
when confronted with corrections, people are sometimes liable to believe the
falsehood even more.106 This reaction may occur because users believe that thirdparty platforms, such as Facebook, regulate to reflect their own biases or to
benefit themselves.
Corrections to false articles can be effective but rendering them effective en
masse may be impracticable. According to Lewandowsky, Ecker and Cook, for
corrections to be effective, they must accomplish two things. First, “they must
not directly challenge peoples’ worldviews” and instead they must “[affirm] the
self-worth of the recipients.” Second, they “must explain why the disinformation
was disseminated in the first place or … provide an alternative explanation of the
relevant event.”107 These requirements may be so cumbersome as to be
unworkable on a large scale. At worst, producing a correction that does not
challenge each user’s worldview, that affirms each user’s self-worth, and that
explains why disinformation is disseminated may be impossible; at best, it will
require a lengthy article explaining the correction in detail. But most news on
third-party platforms is consumed passively and quickly. Many people scroll their
newsfeeds reading only headlines and bylines, following the attached link to the
main body of the article only occasionally, and thus would not benefit from a
correction. Furthermore, for a correction to be effective, it must be noticed, but
there is no guarantee someone who saw the original article will notice a
correction. Even if a platform like Facebook ensures wide distribution of the
correction in respective newsfeeds, people may still scroll past it.
Lewandowsky, Ecker & Cook, supra note 98 at 355.
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Model #2—The Removal Model
Outright removal of disinformation from third-party platforms is another
possible method. Under this model, Facebook and other platforms would use
algorithms and human ability to detect and remove disinformation. This method,
however, has two problems. First, although removing content may prevent more
people from reading disinformation, it fails to inform those who have already
read disinforming articles that they were false and provide them with corrections.
Second, removal may cause the “Streisand effect,” which is when “deleting
content increases audience attention on it.”108 Censorship, when reported, can
garner attention for the item censored, and even lend the item an aura of
legitimacy. The near impossibility of removing something from the online sphere
further exacerbates the “Streisand effect.” Nothing is ever really “gone” from the
internet. Once a third-party platform removes an item, it can be reposted by the
original poster (perhaps even under a different name) or by someone else claiming
to share the supposed censored truth.
Model #3—The Pre-Screening Model
Given the flaws of the flagging and removal methods, I suggest another: the
pre-screening method. Under this method, third-party platforms would use two
methods for detecting potential disinformation. The platform would filter all
user-generated content, as it was posted, through an algorithm designed to detect
disinformation. The algorithm would then place anything identified as potential
disinformation in a queue for review by human fact-checkers, who would then
determine if the item contained political disinformation or not. Until reviewed by
a fact-checker, the post would not be visible to anyone other than the creator of
the post. Alternatively, other users could report posts as possible disinformation.
This method has the potential to annoy platform users whose posts are
mistakenly flagged for review, even though they do not contain disinformation.
Although such mistakes will almost certainly arise as the method is implemented,
the algorithm could be continuously revised to avoid such mistakes in the future.
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The Government of Canada could provide the human architecture required
to oversee third-party platforms as they implement this new cyber architecture.
As Bowers and Zittrain observe, for any anti-disinformation program to be
effective and trusted, the “platform policy” must be “transparent.”109 A
government agency that monitors and assists in the screening of social media
posts for disinformation could lend the program a sense of legitimacy and
transparency. This agency could also work with third-party platforms in the
development of their disinformation-detecting algorithms.
Admittedly, some Canadians could be suspicious of the State intervening in
their speech in this manner. Walking the thin line between protecting citizens
from the proliferation of disinformation and censoring citizens sharing legitimate
information online would be difficult. How the government may do so effectively
is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the involvement of a
democratically-elected government in the fight against online disinformation may
be preferrable to trusting third-party platforms to handle this crisis on its own.

JUSTIFYING SOLUTIONS UNDER SECTION 1
Any government-mandated action taken to combat disinformation will be a
limit on free expression and thus a prima facie violation of section 2(b) of the
Charter.110 Disinformation attempts to convey meaning under section 2(b), and
the purpose of government action to remove disinformation is to restrict the
expression of such meaning.111 Whether such a violation would be justified under
section 1 of the Charter112 is highly dependent upon the legislation’s wording and
application.
That said, there are reasons to believe that such an infringement would be
justified under section 1. First, depending on the legislation itself and the context,
the legislation would likely have valid objectives of protecting informational
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equality.113 The SCC discussed the objective of informational equality in R v
Bryan.114 In that case, the issue on appeal related to section 329 of the Canada
Elections Act, which prohibited news agencies from broadcasting election results
until polling stations had closed everywhere in Canada.115 The court had to
determine whether this infringement of the appellant’s freedom of expression
could be justified under section 1.116 In its decision that the infringement was
justified, the Court held that informational equality, which is seeking to ensure
that “all voters will receive the same information where possible,” is an important
objective in section 1 analyses.117 Online disinformation may disrupt
informational equality because, as discussed above, it may cause voters to receive
entirely different information about current events and political platforms. Thus,
following this logic, if the government uses the methods discussed above to
prevent situations in which “some voters have general access to information that
is denied to others” and to protect informational equality, it will likely be pursuing
a valid section 1 objective.118
Second, and perhaps more importantly, disinformation is contrary to many
of the factors important to freedom of expression under a section 1 analysis: it
disrupts each reader’s search for truth and political self-actualization, and has the
potential to disrupt the political process generally.119 Therefore, the court would
likely find that the government’s fight against disinformation is an important
objective worthy of deference under a section 1 analysis, greatly increasing the
legislation’s chances of being judicially approved as constitutional.
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CONCLUSION
Online disinformation poses a serious threat to Canadians’ ability to cast an
informed vote. To accommodate protection of the right to an informed vote, we
must interpret Canada’s obligations under CUSMA narrowly. Under this
restrictive interpretation, although the government cannot hold third-party
platforms civilly liable for user-generated content, many tools remain for
encouraging or forcing third-party platforms to act against disinformation. Both
private and public interests should be involved in crafting and implementing these
tools. While the government is best suited to provide both a sense of public
legitimacy and guidance on what these tools need to accomplish, private interests
have the technological resources to fashion these tools according to the stated
goals. In the time of the internet, lies are more dangerous and fly more quickly
than ever. It is up to our private and public leaders to clip their wings.

